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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






JINGSHUN LIN,  
a/k/a Jinshun Lin;  
TAI DONG ZHOU, 
 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 




On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A089-922-708 & A089-922-709) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Susan G. Roy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 18, 2012 
Before:  SCIRICA, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 









 Jingshun Lin and Tai Dong Zhou (“petitioners”), both citizens of China, seek 
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying their 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the following reasons, we will deny their petition for 
review. 
I. 
 Zhou entered the United States illegally in 1999, while Lin entered illegally in 
2004.  They met in the United States and were married in 2004.  In 2008, Lin filed an 
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, in which 
she named her husband as a derivative applicant and alleged that she feared persecution 
by the Chinese government because she helped her North Korean cousin escape to South 
Korea through China.  The application was transferred to an immigration court and 
petitioners were placed in removal proceedings on the basis that they were present in the 
United States without authorization – charges that they conceded.  Zhou thereafter filed 
his own application for relief; his claims are predicated solely upon Lin’s claims. 
 A hearing was held before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) at which Lin was the sole 
witness.  She testified that she worked as a clerk at the Household Register Office of the 
Public Security Bureau at the When Chung police station for approximately 12 years.  In 
December 2002, Lin’s North Korean cousin entered China illegally and sought shelter 
with Lin’s parents.  Lin urged her mother to persuade her cousin to return to North Korea, 
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and attempted to persuade him herself, but he refused to return.  In February 2003, Lin 
used the authority of her office to prepare a false Chinese identification card for her 
cousin, which he used to facilitate his escape to South Korea.  At the hearing, Lin 
acknowledged that her conduct was illegal.   
 In November 2003, government officials became aware of Lin’s actions and 
ordered her to serve 60 days in the Public Security Bureau’s detention center.1  Lin 
testified that, while detained, she was interrogated two or three times by Public Security 
Bureau officials, who slapped her in her face two or three times.  She was also harassed 
by fellow detainees.  When she was released, she was fired from her job and ordered to 
continue cooperating with the Public Security Bureau.  She fled to the United States in 
April 2004.   
 In September 2007, Lin’s sister was detained for 15 days based on accusations that 
she helped Lin depart China.  Additionally, Public Security Bureau officials visited Lin’s 
parents’ home.  As a result, Lin filed her application based on her fear of returning to 
China.       
 The IJ denied petitioners’ applications finding, among other things, that Lin failed 
to testify credibly.
2
  The IJ therefore ordered the petitioners removed to China.  The BIA 
                                              
1
 In her application, Lin contended that she was also expelled from the Communist Party, 
although she did not mention that fact at the hearing. 
2
 Although Lin did not file her asylum application within one year of arriving in the 
United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), the IJ concluded, “giving [Lin] the benefit of 
the doubt,” that the events of 2007 constituted changed circumstances sufficient to justify 
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dismissed petitioners’ appeal, concluding that (1) the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was 
not clearly erroneous; (2) Lin could not establish that she was persecuted or had a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of her political opinion; (3) Zhou’s claims 
for asylum and withholding of removal failed with Lin’s claims; and (4) neither Lin nor 
Zhou established that they would more likely than not be tortured if returned to China.  
Petitioners filed a timely petition for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review the facts upon 
which the BIA’s decision rests for substantial evidence and exercise de novo review over 
the BIA’s legal conclusions.  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Under the substantial evidence standard, we will uphold the BIA’s decision unless “any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). 
 Petitioners first attack the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, claiming that it is flawed 
in several respects.  We need not address those arguments because we conclude that 
petitioners’ claims fail, even assuming that Lin testified credibly. 
 To be eligible for asylum, an alien must establish past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground, and that 
the protected ground is one of the central reasons for the persecution.  See 8 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                                                                  
the late filing.  (A.R. 15.)  The BIA did not disturb that ruling. 
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§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Petitioners contend that, if returned to China, Lin would be persecuted on account of her 
political opinion, as she “clearly did not like the Chinese Government’s policy [toward 
North Korean refugees].”  (Pet’rs’ Br. 25.)  However, nothing in the record establishes 
that she held any political opinion whatsoever concerning China’s treatment of North 
Korean refugees.  To the contrary, her testimony indicates that she acted out of concern 
for her cousin’s welfare.  (A.R. 260-61.)  Furthermore, the record supports the BIA’s 
conclusion that Lin was detained because she engaged in illegal conduct – in particular, 
abusing the authority of her office to obtain false documents for her cousin – as opposed 
to her politics.
3
  See Li v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 136, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying 
petition for review given the lack of “any specific evidence concerning [alien’s] political 
opinions” or evidence that the Chinese government would enforce a generally applicable 
law forbidding Chinese citizens from assisting illegal North Korean immigrants in a 
pretextual manner).  As the record does not compel the conclusion that petitioners are 
                                              
3
 Petitioners argue that Lin’s detention was not a “legitimate prosecution” because she 
was not formally charged with a crime and never appeared in court.  (Pet’rs’ Br. 26.)  
However, the documentary evidence reflects that the Chinese government operates 
numerous administrative detention centers that function separately from the formal court 
system, which are apparently legal even if misused.  (A.R. 361-63.)  Regardless, even 
assuming that Lin’s detention did not accord with proper procedures, she still has not 
established that it was centrally motivated by a political opinion she allegedly held as 
opposed to her illegal actions.  In that respect, her case is easily distinguishable from Li 
v. Holder, 559 F.3d 1096, 1110-12 (9th Cir. 2009) (BIA’s rejection of asylum claim was 
not supported by substantial evidence because the record reflected that the petitioner did 
not violate Chinese law by providing shelter to North Korean refugees).   
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entitled to asylum, they necessarily cannot meet the higher burden for establishing 
eligibility for withholding of removal.  See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469-70 (3d 
Cir. 2003). 
 Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s rejection of petitioners’ CAT claims.  
Lin acknowledged that she was not tortured in the past on account of her actions and, 
although her documentary evidence reflects “harsh and degrading” prison conditions in 
China, (A.R. 360), it does not establish that she would likely be tortured upon return.  
Accordingly, the record does not compel a finding in her favor.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.18(a) (defining torture, in relevant part, as “any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” exclusive of 
“lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” and “pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions”); see also Kang 
v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 165 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Deplorable prison conditions do 
not, by themselves, constitute torture.”).  Likewise, nothing in the record suggests that 
Zhou would likely be tortured if returned to China. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review 
